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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH#

J

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

i

RICKY PALMER,

i

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890583-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of retail theft, a
third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-602(1) and 766-412(l)(b)(i) (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress an x-ray
taken of him without his consent and without a warrant pursuant
to an order of the police, and a diamond ring revealed by the xray and subsequently seized by the police after the ring was
naturally passed from defendant's body in a bowel movement.
The standard of review for defendant's challenge to the
lower court's suppression ruling is that set forth in State v.
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,
(Utah 1989):

P.2d

In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
The trial judge is in the best position to
assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. However,
in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
"correction of error" standard.
771 P.2d at 327 (citations omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ricky Palmer, was charged with retail theft,
a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-6-602 and 76-6412(l)(b)(i) (1990) (R. 6-7).
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress, defendant entered and the court accepted a conditional
guilty plea to the charge pursuant to State v. Sery# 758 P.2d
935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (R. 31-37; T. 81-83).

Under Sery,

defendant preserved the suppression issue for appellate review.
The court sentenced defendant to a term of zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison, fined him $2,500, and ordered him
to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the Board of
Pardons (R. 38).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the most part, the statement of facts in
defendant's brief on appeal is an accurate summary of the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the trial court.
However, several clarifications are necessary.
First, defendant's statement of facts suggests that he
was not under arrest until after the x-ray had been taken and

-9-

developed.

Br. of Appellant at, b

To the contrary, Sgt. Mayo of

the Salt Lake City Police Department, who directed the
investigation, made clear that defendant had been advised that he
was under arrest at the store, well before the x-ray examination
(T. 30-31)

And, the trial court so found (T. 76).

Second, Sqt

Mfty«i testified that he based his decision

to obtain an x-ray of defendant on the following factors:

(1)

once at Sears, he had learned that there had been a theft of a
diamond ring from the jeweliy counter and that defendant was the
prime suspect based on information from the store clerk and
security guards; (2) ? thorough search of the parking lot by the
police and securit

K

^oduced the rii lg; (3) a strip

search of defendant had likewise not produced the ring; (4) "if,
1n fact, the ring had been discarded in the parking lot, every
minute that went by would increase the likelihood tillat someone
would locate the ring and it would be lost" (T. 27-28).
respect to the exigencies present, Sgt. Mayo stated:
Because of the value of the ring, if it was
not inside Mr. Palmer, then I was going to
bring out some more officers and we were
going to do a more detailed search of the
parking lot. But it was getting late, and as
I say, the only place it could have been once
in the parking lot, was under some of the
cars. Because we did a fairly detailed
search, and the cars were leaving, as soon as
the customers were finished shopping at
Sears, we were going to be able to do a more
detailed search. It was getting late. It
was getting dark and cars were leaving[.] I
felt we were under some type of time
constraint. So, I wanted them to advise me
as soon as possible of the result of the xray.
tT

2 y).

With

Finally, contrary to defendant's contention that Sgt.
Mayo Hacknowledged that it would take less than two hours to
obtain a warrant by telephone," Br. of Appellant at 4-5, Mayo's
testimony is most fairly interpreted as indicating that a warrant
could be obtained in no less than two hours (T. 40-41).

Indeed,

the trial court specifically found that "it would have taken a
minimum of two hours to obtain a search warrant" (T. 77).
The trial court made detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law from the bench (T. 74-81), which are attached
as an addendum to this brief.

The trial court's factual

findings, which defendant does not challenge, form the basis for
this Court's review of the lower court's legal conclusions, which
are challenged by defendant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial correctly concluded that the police-ordered
x-ray of defendant, which was obtained without his consent or a
warrant, did not constitute a fourth amendment violation.

That

warrantless search was consistent with the principles set forth
in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Alternatively, the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress may be affirmed on the basis of Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), which enunciated the "inevitable
discovery" doctrine.

_ VI _

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
POLICE ORDERED X-RAY OF DEFENDANT, WHICH WAS
OBTAINED WITHOUT HIS CONSENT OR A WARRANT,
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A FOURTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATION; ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF THE
WARRANTLESS X-RAY VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, THE DIAMOND RING RECOVERED FROM
DEFENDANT AFTER THE X-RAY HAD BEEN TAKEN WAS
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY"
RULE.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress the x-ray of his body that was
obtained by the pol ice withoi it h I s consent and without a warrant,
and the ring that was revealed in the x-ray and subsequently
seized by the police after the ring was naturally passed from his
body ii i a bowel movement.

claims that the x-ray should have

been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of the
principles set forth in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), and that the ring also should have been suppressed as
"fruit of the poisonous tree," see State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214,
1216 (1 Jtah Ct. App. 1988) (discussing "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine).
Under Schmerber, a warrantless intrusion into the body
is justi fi ed i inder the fourth amendment if (1) reasonable methods
are used, (2) there is probable cause that evidence will be
found, and (3) there are exigent circumstances which make it
impi act ic.aM v in oht d J i i a search warrant first.

See 384 U.S. at

770, 771-72; 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure S5.3(c), at 50 (2d eci,
1987).

The State has no quarrel with defendant that the taking

of an x-iay In a typt.' of minor bodily intrusion which is subject

to the proscriptions of Schmerber.

See, e.g., United States v.

Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982); People v. Williams, 157
Ill.App.3d 996, 109 111.Dec. 577, 510 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1987);
State v. Mabon, 648 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1982).

Cf.

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (which dealt with the "more
substantial intrusion" of surgery).
At trial, defendant argued that the x-ray and the ring
should be suppressed because the second and third prongs of the
Schmerber test had not been satisfied (T. 63-66).

On appeal,

defendant expands his challenge to include the first prong of
Schmerber, arguing that the manner in which the x-ray was
obtained was not reasonable.

Br. of Appellant at 23-26.

Because

this latter argument was not presented to the trial court in
support of defendant's motion to suppress, it is not properly
before this Court and should not be considered on appeal.
Although some evidence was presented as to the possible dangers
of x-rays, which the trial court did not find particularly
helpful (T. 53-55), and substantial evidence was presented as to
the struggle that occurred between the officers and defendant at
the hospital during the x-ray examination, defense counsel merely
stated with regard to the first prong of Schmerber:
The first is the [means] used to
effectuate the search must be reasonable. In
Schmerber, there was a blood test, hospital
conditions, that sort of thing. I would
simply submit it on the evidence presented.
(T. 63). This does not even approach the argument now presented
on appeal.

See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)

("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for

suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal.").
Accordingly, the State will limit its response to defendant's
arguments regarding the second two prongs of Schmerber.
A. Probable Cause
The first question is whether the police had a "clear
indication" that the ring was inside defendant's body.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. As defendant correctly notes, the
issue of whether this "clear indication" requirement is more
demanding than the normal probable cause requirement is a matter
of some uncertainty.

See People v. Williams# 510 N.E.2d at 447.

Although it can be argued that this requirement is somewhat more
demanding than the usual probable cause requirement, see 2
LaFave, Search and Seizure §5.3(c), at 502 (2d ed. 1987), it is
most reasonably interpreted as requiring nothing more than that
there be probable cause to search.
such an interpretation.

Various courts have adopted

See, e.g., State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489,

492-93 (Me. 1985); People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192, 1196
(Colo. 1984).

This position finds clear support in United States

v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), where the Supreme
Court, in the context of deciding what level of suspicion would
justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than
a border search, stated:
The Court of Appeals held that the initial
detention of respondent was permissible only
if the inspectors possessed a "clear
indication" of alimentary canal smuggling.
The trial court concluded that "clear indication" means "there
is a very high probability" (T. 78).

This "clear indication" language comes from
our opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908
(1966)# but we think the Court of Appeals
misapprehended the significance of that
phrase in the context in which it was used in
Schmerber. The Court of Appeals viewed
"clear indication" as an intermediate
standard between "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause." But we think that the
words in Schmerber were used to indicate the
need for particularized suspicion that the
evidence sought might be found within the
body of the individual, rather than as
enunciating still a third Fourth Amendment
threshold between "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause."
No other court, including this one, has
ever adopted Schmerber's "clear indication"
language as a Fourth Amendment standard. . .
. We do not think that the Fourth Amendment's
emphasis upon reasonableness is consistent
with the creation of a third verbal standard
in addition to "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause"; we are dealing with a
constitutional requirement of reasonableness,
not mens rea, and subtle verbal gradations
may obscure rather than elucidate the meaning
of the provision in question.
473 U.S. at 540-41 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Using traditional "probable cause" as the touchstone,
the question thus becomes whether the police had probable cause
to believe that defendant had swallowed the ring and that it
would be revealed by an x-ray.

"In dealing with probable cause,

. . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act."

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,

542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 388
U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).

_o_

The quantum of evidence needed for probable
cause is significantly less than needed to
prove guilt. Whether probable cause exists
"depends upon an examination of all the
information available to the searching
officer in light of the circumstances as they
existed at the time the search was made."
The officer is also "entitled to assess the
facts in light of [his or her] experience."
State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231f 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted; brackets in original).
Applying the foregoing definition of probable cause,
the police had probable cause to believe that defendant had
swallowed the ring missing from the jewelry counter and that it
would be revealed by an x-ray.

The trial court made the

following findings of fact, not challenged by defendant on
appeal, which support that conclusion:
We have testimony from Ms. Hurtado [a
Sears security guard] as to her conversations
with the salesman and as to her own
observations, which she states that she
conveyed to the police officers when they
arrived at the scene. She testified
basically that the salesman informed her that
the young man that had just gone out the door
had switched rings[.] . . . She looked out of
the door and immediately saw a young man and
saw no other young men in the a r e a . . . . She
kept her eye on him at all times until
reinforcements arrived[,] and they confronted
him, these being all people connected with
security of the Sears store.
This information was conveyed to the
police officers by Ms. Hurtado and formed
part of the bases upon [sic] their actions.
They further talked to the salesman who
informed them that the man had switched
rings. Ms. Hurtado also informed the police
that they had searched thoroughly the areas
over which the defendant had travelled and
had not found a ring[,] and the police made a
second search with her and others from
Sears[,] all searching for the ring. They
searched garbage cans and every area that was
available to them at the time.

The police officer gave a Miranda Warning
and arrested the defendant. And after such a
warning, the defendant made the statement, "I
might have had the ring and might have thrown
it onto the roof." Upon that statement being
made, the police had the roof searched and
they could not find the ring. . . .
The evidence would indicate that the
police officers believed that under all of
the circumstances that the defendant had
swallowed the ring. They base this on the
fact that he had been under constant survey
[sic] from the time he left the jewelry
section of Sears. That they made a thorough
search of the area over which he had
travelled, that they had searched him
personally by strip searching his clothing,
and they concluded that he had swallowed the
ring[,] and based upon that they concluded
they needed an x-ray. They needed to inspect
the contents of his digestive system.
(T. 75-77).

The court then correctly concluded:

Based upon all these facts, the Court,
first of all, finds that the police had
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
believe the defendant had committed a crime
and had reason to therefore arrest him. And
furthermore, the Court finds that there was a
very high probability, based upon the
factsf,] that the defendant had in fact
ingested the ring.
(T. 77-78).
The facts of this case are remarkably similar to those
in People v. Williams, where the Illinois Court of Appeals
concluded that there was probable cause to support an x-ray
examination of the defendant, who the police suspected had
ingested a diamond ring stolen shortly before from a jewelry
store.

There, two sheriff deputies stopped a vehicle reported to

be involved in the theft of a jewelry store and arrested the
occupants, one of whom was the defendant.

_i n _

510 N.E.2d at 446.

After they had transported the defendant to the sheriff's office,
the officers were informed that two rings had been taken in the
jewelry theft, including a diamond ring.

Ibid.

[One of the officers then] noticed that the
ring which he had observed on the little
finger of defendant's right hand at the time
of the arrest was no longer there.
Furthermore, defendant told the officers that
he knew nothing about the ring. In addition,
the officers conducted a visual strip search
of defendant and searched defendant's
clothing, the squad car, the path leading
from the squad car to the sheriff's office
and the jail facility where the defendant was
being held but could not find the ring.
Id. at 448.

On these facts, the Williams court concluded that

the officers had probable cause to believe that the ring would be
found in the defendant's body, thus providing a basis for
subjecting the defendant to an x-ray examination,

^[d. at 447-48.

There is no reason to reach a different conclusion on the very
similar facts presented in the instant case.
B. Exigent Circumstances
Whether there were exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless and nonconsensual x-ray examination of defendant
presents a more difficult question.

The trial court made the

following findings on that issue:
The testimony is, it would have taken a
minimum of two hours to obtain a search
warrant, either telephonically or otherwise.
And that [the officers] felt the need to move
ahead immediately because of the
circumstances and because of the possibility
that could exist that if, in fact, it was not
in [defendant's] digestive system, this ring
might be out there someplace on the parking
lot and needed to be recovered immediately.

The Court finds that there were exigent
circumstances making it impracticable to
obtain a search warrant because of . . . the
value of the ring and the approaching
darkness, and the fact that the parking lot
was such a public area.
The Court does rely upon the case of
People vs. Williams, out of Illinois, and in
that particular case the Illinois Court
stated: "The deputies in the case at bar did
not know whether the defendant had placed the
ring in his mouth or whether he had discarded
the ring in some other manner that an
unauthorized person could obtain control of
the ring. As a result, the deputies needed
to know whether they needed to begin a
detailed search of every place where the
defendant had been since his arrest,
including the thoroughfare where he was
arrested. Stated differently, the deputies
needed to act quickly in order to prevent the
destruction or concealment of the ring."
In this case the evidence is much more
clear and I believe the evidence shows that .
. . there was such a high probability that he
had swallowed the ring because [the officers]
had, in fact, made a thorough search of
everywhere. No avenues seemed left where it
could be. However, since that is a
possibility that could exist, and because it
was such a public place and because dark was
approaching, that the circumstances were of
such a nature as to require an immediate,
final determination in this regard[,] and
they were therefore justified in making this
determination and not waiting for a search
warrant, which would have put them by the
time they obtained the warrant, then got
through all the procedures for the x-rays,
would have certainly put them into the total
night hours[.] . . .
(T. 78-79).
This case admittedly requires an exigent circumstance
analysis different from that traditionally engaged in by the
courts.

This is so because the exigent circumstances identified

by the trial court involve the possible destruction or

concealment of evidence not necessarily thought to be in the
place to be searched —

i.e., the interior of defendant's body.

Put another way, the exigency involved the possible destruction
or concealment of the ring at a location other than defendant's
body if the officers did not quickly obtain an x-ray of defendant
to determine whether the ring was inside of him; there was no
perceived danger that the ring would be destroyed or concealed
within defendant if an immediate x-ray examination of him were
not performed.

Cf:. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (exigent

circumstance justified warrantless extraction of blood from
defendant's bloodstream which the police reasonably believed
contained alcohol); State v. Ashe# 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987)
(exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into and
search of residence officers reasonably believed contained
contraband).
In determining that there were exigent circumstances to
justify the warrantless, nonconsensual x-ray examination of
defendant, the trial court relied heavily on the Williams
decision, particularly the portion that it quoted regarding the
officers' need to know whether the defendant had ingested the
ring so that they could determine whether it was necessary "to
begin a detailed search of every place [the] defendant had been
since his arrest, including the public thoroughfare where he was
arrested."

In Williams, "the deputies needed to act quickly in

order to prevent the destruction or concealment of the ring."
510 N.E.2d at 448.

The Illinois court specifically distinguished

the case at bar from People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal.3d 394, 124

Cal. Rptr. 528, 540 P.2d 624 (1975), a case cited by defendant in
the instant case in support of his argument that exigent
circumstances did not exist, where police officers, after
observing the defendant place two balloons in her mouth and
swallow them, required her to drink an emitic solution which
caused her to regurgitate seven balloons containing heroin.

The

California Supreme Court held that the warrantless intrusion into
the defendant's body constituted an unreasonable search because
-there was no substantial reason to believe that evidence would
be destroyed[,]" and it "appear[ed] that [the] defendant . . .
easily could have been transported to jail and placed in an
isolation cell and kept under proper surveillance.M

124 Cal.

Rptr. at 535, 540 P.2d at 631. As the Williams court correctly
noted, these circumstances were quite different from the
situation before it, where the officers, although having probable
cause to believe the defendant had swallowed the ring, were
legitimately concerned that the ring might still be in a public
area where it could easily be destroyed or concealed.
at 448.

510 N.E.2d

This latter circumstance required prompt action, and

therefore the warrantless, nonconsensual x-ray examination of the
defendant was justified.
Although the question is admittedly a close one, in the
instant case the trial court correctly applied the Williams
analysis in concluding that there were exigent circumstances
which justified the warrantless, nonconsensual x-ray examination
of defendant.

The State agrees with defendant that the value of

the ring, which the court apparently relied upon to some extent,

did not contribute to the exigencies of the situation.

The

impending darkness and the public nature of the area in which the
ring might be more clearly constituted exigent circumstances, in
that they related directly to the immediate threat of destruction
or concealment of the ring.

See Schmerbery 384 U.S. at 771

(immediate threat of destruction of evidence constitutes exigent
circumstance).

Although this case does not present the usual

exigent circumstance scenario, even defendant acknowledges that
"the term exigent circumstances is incapable of precise
definition."

Br. of Appellant at 15 (quoting State v. Clark, 654

P.2d 355, 360 (Ha. 1982)).

With this in mind, the Williams case,

while unique on its facts and holding concerning exigent
circumstances, provides reasonable support for the lower court's
ruling.
C. "Inevitable Discovery" Rule
If the Court determines that the warrantless x-ray
examination of defendant was not lawful under Schmerber, the ring
subsequently seized by the police after it had naturally passed
from defendant's body was admissible under the "inevitable
discovery" rule.
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court adopted the "inevitable discovery" rule as
an exception to the exclusionary rule. As stated by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals:
The "inevitable discovery" exception
adopted by the Court in Nix . . . allows the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence
if the government can show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the tainted evidence
would inevitably have been discovered through

lawful means. This doctrine requires that
"the fact or likelihood that makes the
discovery inevitable arise from circumstances
other than those disclosed by the illegal
search itself."
United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir.
1989).

The question presented in the instant case is whether the

record demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the
ring would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means
by the police.

As Professor LaFave correctly warns, "courts must

be extremely careful not to apply the 'inevitable discovery' rule
upon the basis of nothing more than a hunch or speculation as to
what otherwise might have occurred.

A 'majority of the courts

that have utilized the exception have tended to define the
necessary probability in terms of 'would,' and that requirement
must be strictly adhered to."

4 LaFave, Search and Seizure

§11.4(a), at 383 (2d ed. 1987) (footnote omitted).
After the police arrived at Sears, they gathered
sufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest
defendant for theft of the ring.

As previously noted, they

arrested defendant at the scene, before he was transported to the
hospital for the x-ray examination.

Defendant does not claim

that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him before the
x-ray was obtained.

What he does argue is that, instead of

subjecting him to an x-ray examination, the police simply should
have done that which they did anyway to recover the ring —

i.e.,

place him in an isolation cell and wait for him to pass the ring
through a bowel movement.

Br. of Appellant at 22-23.

placed defendant under arrest at the scene and made a

Having

contemporaneous inquiry to the jail to determine whether an
isolation cell (i.e., one where defendant's feces could be
recovered and he could be kept under surveillance (T. 33)) was
available for defendant, the police, once they suspected that
defendant had swallowed the ring, clearly intended to place
defendant in an isolation cell at some point in an effort to
recover the ring.
without the x-ray.

Obviously, this would have been done even
The record demonstrates this by at least a

preponderance of the evidence.
this point.

Defendant effectively concedes

See Br. of Appellant at 22-23 ("In the present case,

officers could have placed Mr. Palmer in isolation and under
observation during the time it would have taken to get a search
warrant. . . . Furthermore, the ring would have passed through
his system in a short period of time.

Mr. Palmer was ultimately

placed in isolation and the ring passed through his system (T.
61-2).

This could have been done without obtaining an x-ray.").
Thus, even if it is assumed that the x-ray examination

violated Schmerber and the x-ray therefore was inadmissible, the
ultimate seizure of the ring (which, unlike the x-ray, is the
critical evidence in the case) resulted from an entirely lawful
procedure which the police would have naturally followed in such
circumstances and which defendant sanctions in his brief.
Accordingly, the ring was admissible under the "inevitable
discovery" rule adopted in Nix.

See United States v. Andrade,

784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986) (even if search of
defendant's garment bag not lawful search incident to arrest an
hour earlier, evidence admissible under "inevitable discovery"

rule, as "it is normal DEA procedure to inventory defendant's
possessions, including a garment bag, at the time of booking");
State v. Vinclk, 436 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 1989) (though gun on
bed under sheet obtained in illegal warrantless search at
homicide scene, inevitable discovery rule applicable, as gun was
certain to be discovered upon later removal of body).

Cf. United

States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 695-96 (2nd Cir. 1988) (immediate
warrantless search of bag arrested defendant had been carrying
was illegal due to lack of exigent circumstances; evidence not
admissible on ground it would inevitably have been discovered in
later inventory, as "the record reveals no evidence that such
searches were an invariable, routine proceeding in the booking
and detention of a suspect at the particular FBI office
involved").

Even though the trial court did not rely on the

inevitable discovery rule in denying defendant's motion to
suppress, this Court "may affirm the trial court's ruling on any
proper grounds."

State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985).

See also State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 405 (Utah 1989); State v.
Vincik, 436 N.W.2d at 354 ("It does not matter that the district
court did not rely on [the inevitable discovery rule] when
admitting the gun and the t-shirt, for its ruling will be upheld
if sustainable on any grounds appearing in the record.").
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
(in its entirety or, at the very least, insofar as the ring was

_1 Q -

ruled admissible).

His conviction should therefore also be
LL~~—

affirmed.
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ADDENDUM

that before you make an intrusion into someone's body,
you have judicial review to determine whether or not it
is appropriate. That hasn't been done and because of
that all of the evidence should be suppressed.
THE COURT: We will be in recess until 1:30.
am going to take that time to review these Law Review
Articles and review these facts and render a decision at
that time.
MR. BRADSHAW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(At noon Court recessed until 1:30 p.m.)
THE COURT:

Let the record show we are back in

session in State of Utah vs. Palmer.

The defendant is

present with counsel and the State is represented by its
counsel.

I have reviewed carefully the facts, the

evidence that has been received during this hearing, and
I have also reviewed the case submitted by the State at
the beginning of this hearing upon which they rely:
People vs. Williams, 510 NE 2d 445. The case out of
Illinois, 1987 case. And I have also reviewed the Law
Review Article and the other article presented by the
defense dealing with the question of post arrest -dealing with the question of inspections of and
intrusions into the body.

And I am now ready to make a

ruling on the defense's Motion for Suppression.
The facts in this particular case have to be
7

analyzed from the point of view of the police officers in
determining whether or not they had probable cause for
arrest, and whether or not they had Justifiable reason
under the law for a search by way of x-ray and whether or
not they used reasonable methods. And this depends upon
the evidence that is received, and again the standard is
not a subjective standard.

It is an objective standard

of what a reasonable police officer would do under the
same circumstances, with the same facts in mind, had he
been on the scene at that time.
We have testimony from Ms. Hurtado as to her
conversations with the salesman and as to her own
observations, which she states that she conveyed to the
police officers when they arrived at the scene. She
testified basically that the salesman informed her that
the young man that had just gone out the door had
switched rings, and she testified that she ran to the
door and looked out.

I don't remember "ran to the door."

She looked out of the door and immediately saw a young
man and saw no other young men in the area.

And I think

she said no other men in the area and she kept her eye on
him at all times until reinforcements arrived and they
confronted him, these being all people connected with
security of the Sears store.
This information was conveyed to the police
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officers by Ms. Hurtado and formed part of the bases upon
their actions.

They further talked to the salesman who

informed them that the man had switched rings.
Ms. Hurtado also informed the police that they had
searched thoroughly the areas over which the defendant
had travelled and had not found a ring and the police
made a second search with her and others from Sears all
searching for the ring.

They searched garbage cans and

every area that was available to them at that time.
The police officer gave a Miranda Warning and
arrested the defendant.

And after such a warning, the

defendant made the statement, "I might have had the ring
and I might have thrown it onto the roof."

Upon that

statement being made, the police had the roof searched
and they could not find the ring.

The evidence indicates

the ring was of great value, being a diamond ring. The
facts indicate that it was getting dark, that the police
did search the defendant, a strip search, as well as his
clothing and there was some concern and fear that with
dark approaching, if in fact the defendant had disposed
of the ring under a car or flipped it someplace, that
someone may have picked it up and because of this they
felt some urgency in determining once — well, in
determining with certainty that the ring was not on the
person of the defendant.
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The evidence would indicate that the police
officers believed that under all of the circumstances
that the defendant had swallowed the ring.

They base

this on the fact that he had been under constant survey
from the time he left the jewelry section of Sears. That
they had made a thorough search of the area over which he
had travelled, that they had searched him personally by
strip searching his clothing, and they concluded that he
had swallowed the ring and based upon that they concluded
they needed an x-ray.

They needed to inspect the

contents of his digestive system.
The testimony is, it would have taken a minimum
of two hours to obtain a search warrant, either
telephonically or otherwise.

And that they felt the need

to move ahead immediately because of the circumstances
and because of the possibility that could exist that if,
in fact, it was not in his digestive system, this ring
might be out there someplace on the parking lot and
needed to be recovered immediately.
Based upon all of these facts, the Court, first
of all, finds that the police had probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant had
committed a crime and had reason to therefore arrest him.
And further more, the Court finde that there was a very
high probability, based upon the facts that the defendant
77

1

had in fact ingested the ring.

2

I

Some of the cases talk about clear indication.

3

J

There has to be a clear indication.

4

J

that there is not a clear definition of what that means,

5

J

but it means more than probable cause.

6

I

than absolute certainty and the best evidence that I read

The cases also say

It means less

7

was that what clear indication means is that there is a

8

very high probability.

9

I

And based upon the evidence and

facts that this Court has heard, that the information

10

available to the police at that time would indicate a

11 I

very high probability that the defendant had, in fact,

12

swallowed this ring because they had excluded by thorough

13

search other possibilities.

14

The Court finds that there were exigent

15

circumstances making it impracticable to obtain a search

16

warrant because of the fact that immediate information

17

had concerning the ring was with certainty had to be made

18 I

because of the value of the ring and the approaching

19 J

darkness, and the fact that the parking lot was such a

20 I

public area.

21 I

The Court does rely upon the case of People vs.

22 J

Williams, out of Illinois, and in that particular case

23 I

the Illinois Court stated:

24

bar did not know whether the defendant had placed the

25 I

ring in his mouth or whether he had discarded the ring in

"The deputies in the case at
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Borne other manner that an unauthorized pwreon eouiw
obtain control of the ring.

As a result, the deputies

needed to know whether the defendant had ingested the
ring or whether they needed to begin a detailed search of
everyplace where the defendant had been since his arrest,
including the thoroughfare where he was arrested.

Stated

differently, the deputies needed to act quickly in orderto prevent the destruction or concealment of the ring."
In this case the evidence is much more clear
and I believe the evidence shows that the police
officers —

that there was such a high probability that

he had swallowed the ring because they had, in fact, made
a thorough search of everywhere.
where it would be.

No avenues seemed left

However, since that is a possibility

that could exist, and because it was such a public place
and because dark was approaching, that the circumstances
were of such a nature as to require an immediate, final
determination in this regard and they were therefore
justified in making this determination and not waiting
for a search warrant, which would have put them by the
time they obtained the warrant, then got through all of
the procedures for the x-rays, would have certainly put
them into the total night hours, which brings us really
to the third leg of whether or not there was reasonable
means that were chosen to detect this ring with
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1 I

certainty.

2

Actually, there would have been four things the

3

officers could have done.

They could have induced

4 I

vomiting.

5 I

in the stomach or travelled through into the digestive

6

tract beyond.

7 I

inducement of the vomiting itself, bringing a ring back

8

up through the esophagus, whether there would have been

9

choking.

But then, the question of whether it is still

And the question would have been the very

That is one alternative.

And if that had been

10

done, the same issues would have been here, except as to

11

whether or not that is a method that should have been

12 I

chosen.

13

him open by surgery.

14

and the fourth one would have been to wait for the ring

15 J

to pass.

16 J

same issue of urgency was facing them and that was not an

17 J

alternative at this point under these circumstances.

18

The second alternative would have been to cut
The third would have been by x-ray,

The officers waited for the ring to pass, the

Certainly, the least intrusive of all of the

19 J

methods chosen would have been an x-ray.

20 I

about x-rays, and we all receive them annually for our

21 J

physicals.

22

intrusive of all of the methods chosen to make this

23 I

determination.

24
25 J

We all know

Everyone does and it certainly was the least

It is therefore the conclusion of this Court
that this warrant was searched by x-ray.

It was
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1 J

justified under the totality of the circumstances, along

2

I

with the reasonable inferences of those circumstances in

3

J

this particular case. And defendant's Motion to Suppress

4

I

the said x-ray evidence or evidence to follow the taking

5

I

of the x-ray is denied.

6
7

Now, the Court has made its ruling.
I

8
9

scheduled to commence trial tomorrow morning at 10:00.
MR. BRADSHAW:

I

10

We are

Your Honor, would it be possible

for me to have five or ten minutes with my client?
THE COURT:

Certainly.

Take what time you need

11 I

and we will just be in informal recess while you confer

12 I

with your client.

13 I

(A short recess was taken.)

14

THE COURT:

Let the record show we are back in

15 I

session and now we are in a Pretrial Conference.

16 J

matter being scheduled for trial tomorrow in case of

17

State of Utah vs. Ricky Palmer 89-0718, to be followed

18

immediately by State of Utah vs. Ricky Palmer 89-0719,

19

and the defendant is present.

20

MR. BRADSHAW:

The

Mr. Bradshaw.

Your Honor, in speaking with

21 J

Mr. Bown and speaking with Mr. Palmer, it appears we have

22

a resolution of this case.

23 I

Mr. Palmer would plead guilty as charged in the case that

24

we had before the Court today:

25 I

a conditional plea pursuant to State vs. Sire. That is,

That would be as follows:

89-1900718.

It would be
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